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The present research addresses the question of when and why forgiving might enhance psychological
well-being. The authors predict that forgiving is associated with enhanced well-being but that this
association should be more pronounced in relationships of strong rather than weak commitment. This
hypothesis received good support in Studies 1–3. Studies 2 and 3 addressed the issue of why forgiving
might be associated with psychological well-being, revealing that this association was reduced after
controlling for psychological tension (i.e., a psychological state of discomfort due to conflicting
cognitions and feelings). Study 4 revealed that in the context of marital relationships, tendencies toward
forgiving one’s spouse exhibited a more pronounced association with psychological well-being than did
tendencies to forgive others in general.
Interpersonal relationships often yield good outcomes, such as
companionship, security, and social support. At the same time,
relationships are sometimes challenged by serious conflicts, which
may arise when one of both partners neglects the other’s prefer-
ences or desires. Presumably, conflicts for which one blames the
other are likely to be among the most intense forms of conflict
(e.g., breaking promises, telling secrets to others). How do people
deal with these conflicts or offenses? Do people tend to distance
themselves from such others? Do they tend to forgive such others?
More important, is forgiving associated with enhanced psycholog-
ical well-being, and if so, does it make a difference whether one
forgives a best friend or a casual acquaintance?
The extant literature has devoted considerable attention to in-
terpersonal conflict as well as to the ways in which individuals
may resolve conflicts (e.g., research on close relationships, coop-
eration and competition, conflict and negotiation). At the same
time, the concept of forgiving has received little attention in this
literature. This is surprising, especially because forgiving seems
pertinent to understanding how individuals may effectively cope
with interpersonal conflict. Indeed, some recent evidence suggests
that forgiving may serve to repair a relationship (e.g., Fincham,
2000; McCullough, 2000; McCullough, Sandage, & Worthington,
1997; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Moreover, as
is discussed below, there is evidence that forgiving is associated
with psychological well-being, suggesting that forgiving is a
source of human strength by which individuals sustain or improve
psychological well-being (Al-Mabuk, Enright, & Cardis, 1995;
Coyle & Enright, 1997; Freedman & Enright, 1996; Hebl &
Enright, 1993). According to Hope (1987), forgiving is central to
psychological healing processes. But does forgiving always pro-
mote psychological well-being?
The major purpose of the present research is to illuminate
understanding of when and why interpersonal forgiving is associ-
ated with psychological well-being. We propose that the degree to
which forgiving is associated with psychological well-being
should be conditioned by some key interdependence features that
underlie the relationship between the person and the offender.
Specifically, we suggest that the positive association between
forgiving and psychological well-being is affected by interper-
sonal commitment (defined in terms of intent to persist, long-term
orientation, and psychological attachment; Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult,
Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Using principles of
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van
Lange, 1996), we advance the central hypothesis that forgiving is
associated with enhanced levels of psychological well-being when
a person experiences strong commitment to the offender, whereas
this association should be less pronounced or absent when a person
experiences weak commitment to the offender. In addition, we
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suggest that the failure to forgive others to whom we experience
strong commitment induces high levels of psychological tension,
which in turn may be associated with reduced psychological
well-being.
Is There an Association Between Forgiving and
Psychological Well-Being?
This basic question has been addressed in recent work examin-
ing whether interventions for promoting forgiveness improve psy-
chological well-being. An intervention program designed by En-
right and The Human Development Study Group (1991) revealed
positive results, indicating that the promotion of forgiveness en-
hances psychological well-being among individuals coping with a
variety of serious offenses (e.g., incest, deprivation of love from
parents; Al-Mabuk et al., 1995; Coyle & Enright, 1997; Freedman
& Enright, 1996). Specifically, the program yielded that compared
with the control group, individuals who participated in the program
(i.e., the experimental group) exhibited reduced levels of anxiety,
anger, and depression, as well as enhanced self-esteem.
Although these findings add credence to the claim that forgiving
promotes psychological well-being, this claim needs to be consid-
ered in light of two features that characterize these lines of re-
search. First, the overall sample (the experimental group and the
control group) in these studies may be influenced by self-selection,
because participants wanted to participate in an intervention and
had experienced traumatic or otherwise intense forms of interper-
sonal offense (e.g., incest, deprivation of love from parents). This
raises the question of whether forgiving is associated with psycho-
logical well-being among individuals with more mundane and less
traumatic interpersonal experiences. Second, the vast majority of
the studies on forgiving examined conflicts in close relationships,
which generally are characterized by high levels of commitment,
such as marriage, dating relationships, and family relationships.
Indeed, the one study that did not only include spouses, dating
partners, or relatives revealed no significant differences between
the experimental group and control group (Hebl & Enright, 1993).
This raises the question of whether forgiving is associated with
enhanced psychological well-being for relationships that are less
exclusive. Thus, the present research seeks to address these issues
by examining offenses that appear to be somewhat less traumatic
and that occur not only in the context of close relationships but
also in relationships that are less exclusive than marriage, dating
relationships, or family relationships.
An Interdependence Framework of Forgiving
In understanding forgiving it is important to ask two broad
questions: (a) Which interpersonal experiences give rise to the
dilemma of whether or not to forgive, and (b) what might be the
relationship-relevant features that indicate whether forgiving is or
is not beneficial? As noted earlier, the dilemma of forgiving seems
rooted in a neglect of the other’s preferences. According to inter-
dependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; for a review, see
Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996), relationships may be challenged by
correspondence of outcomes, that is, the degree to which prefer-
ences among individuals correspond versus conflict. When out-
comes are correspondent, it is relatively easy to maintain a
conflict-free relationship. However, when outcomes are less cor-
respondent, there is a basis for serious interpersonal conflict (Rus-
bult et al., 1991; Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997). That is, when
preferences do not correspond, insufficient appreciation of the
partner’s needs can easily result in conflict that frequently is
accompanied by blaming the other. As a result, the person is likely
to experience neglect, depreciation, and anger—emotional expe-
riences that are inherently interpersonal and that tend to challenge
the very relationship with the other.
In light of such experiences, it is to some degree understandable
that people tend to react in a self-interested manner by acting
retaliatory or by socially or psychologically distancing themselves
from the other. However, according to interdependence theory
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), people do not always act to pursue
direct self-interest. Interdependence theory advances a distinction
between the given situation and the effective situation, which may
help in understanding why some individuals are willing to endure
cost or exert effort to ensure the well-being of the relationship or
the partner. The given situation represents the gut level self-
centered preferences, whereas the effective situation represents
broader concerns, such as the pursuit of long-term goals or the
desire to promote both one’s own and a partner’s well-being.
Movement away from given preferences is assumed to result from
transformation of motivation, a process that leads individuals to
devalue their immediate self-interest and act on the basis of
broader considerations. The effective preferences that result from
that process have been demonstrated to be more predictive of
actual behavior than the given preferences, thus providing support
for the transformation process (e.g., Dehue, McClintock, &
Liebrand, 1993; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997;
for a review, see Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). For example,
tendencies toward accommodation (i.e., to respond constructively
rather than destructively to a partner’s potentially destructive be-
havior) are more likely when individuals are provided with plen-
tiful (vs. limited) time to think about the antecedents and conse-
quences of the conflict in light of broader implications for the self,
the partner, or the relationship (Rusbult et al., 1991; Yovetich &
Rusbult, 1994).
Like accommodation, forgiving can be conceptualized in terms
of transformation of motivation in that it presumably entails
broader considerations, such as the pursuit of relationship well-
being or the desire to promote both one’s own and a partner’s
well-being. Indeed, McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997)
used a definition of forgiving that parallels the concept of trans-
formation of motivation. Specifically, they define forgiving as the
set of motivational changes whereby one becomes (a) decreasingly
motivated to retaliate against an offending relationship partner; (b)
decreasingly motivated to maintain estrangement from the of-
fender; and (c) increasingly motivated by conciliation and good-
will for the offender, despite the offender’s hurtful actions (see
also Fincham, 2000; McCullough, 2000). Thus, forgiving is as-
sumed to result from a transformation process or from broader
considerations such as concern with the well-being of the partner
or relationship.
We now turn to the second question: What might be the
relationship-relevant features that determine whether forgiving is
or is not beneficial? Following interdependence theory, as well as
extensions of this theory (i.e., the investment model of commit-
ment processes; Rusbult, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1991), commitment
is argued to be a major determinant of transformation of motiva-
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tion. Commitment is defined as the intent to persist in a relation-
ship, including long-term orientation to the involvement and feel-
ings of psychological attachment to the partner (Agnew, Van
Lange, Rusbult, & Langston, 1998; Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew,
1998). As demonstrated in several studies, commitment is predic-
tive of various cognitions and behaviors, including not only ac-
commodation but also willingness to sacrifice, unrealistically pos-
itive beliefs about the relationship, and a shift in thinking from “I,
me, and mine” to “we, us, and ours” (e.g., Agnew et al., 1998;
Rusbult, Van Lange, Wildschut, Yovetich, & Verette, 2000; Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997; Van Lange, Rusbult, et
al., 1997; Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).
Given that forgiving can be conceptualized as involving pro-
relationship transformation, an important determinant of forgiving
should be the level of relational commitment (for recent evidence,
see Finkel, Rusbult, Hannon, Kumashiro, & Childs, 2002; McCul-
lough, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Pargament, &
Thoresen, 2000). However, these findings do not imply that strong
commitment will always lead to forgiving. In fact, sometimes it
may be even harder to forgive another to whom we feel strong
commitment than another to whom we feel weak commitment. For
example, under some circumstances, a potentially destructive act,
such as breaking a promise, might evoke less forgiving in highly
committed relationships because it violates some key features and
expectations that are more characteristic of highly committed
relationships (e.g., trust and dependability). Indeed, it is possible
that one remains quite committed to the relationship partner de-
spite the fact that one has not yet forgiven the other. Alternatively,
especially in relationships varying from best friends to casual
acquaintances, individuals might consider distancing themselves
(psychologically, socially, or both) from the other (e.g., Aron &
Aron, 1997; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Drigotas &
Rusbult, 1992; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). Thus, in the context of
ongoing relationships, people may at any point in time find them-
selves confronted with one of four situations, which are a function
of (a) absence versus presence of forgiving and (b) weak versus
strong commitment (see Figure 1). From this perspective, the
question becomes which situation forms the more serious threat to
psychological well-being.
We propose that in comparison with the other three situations,
the combination of no forgiving and strong commitment is likely
to give rise to relatively strong levels of psychological tension,
defined as a psychological state of discomfort due to conflicting
cognitions and feelings.1 Why is the absence of forgiving in
combination with strong levels of commitment likely to create
psychological tension? We suggest that the absence of forgiving is
inconsistent with each of the three components of commitment:
intent to persist, long-term orientation, and psychological
attachment.
First, the absence of forgiving is at odds with intent to persist in
that lack of forgiving is associated with avoidance, distancing, and
sometimes even motivation to retaliate (McCullough et al., 1998).
Each of these features challenges the stability of the relationship
and therefore is at odds with intent to persist. Hence, the absence
of forgiving is likely to elicit psychological tension.
Second, the absence of forgiving is at odds with the goal of
long-term orientation, because the future of the relationship be-
comes more uncertain. With increasing uncertainty, it is more
difficult to invest in a relationship, to develop new joint activities,
or to pursue other longer term goals. Moreover, the lack of for-
giving should form a threat to a basic level of trust and depend-
ability that tend to be givens in a relationship of strong commit-
ment (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kelley, 1983; Wieselquist,
Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999). Hence, an increasing uncer-
tainty regarding the long-term implications of the relationship is
likely to elicit psychological tension.
Third, the lack of forgiving is at odds with feelings of psycho-
logical attachment. The lack of forgiving is inconsistent with
feeling connected and the need to belong as well as with attraction
and idealized images of the partner that are associated with psy-
chological attachment regarding a specific other (e.g., Agnew et
al., 1998; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, one might argue
that to the degree that attachment represents a merging of self and
the other (i.e., the other is part of the self; Aron & Aron, 1997;
Aron et al., 1991), the lack of forgiving logically implies that one
has not forgiven a part of the self. Also, given that motivations
such as resentment tend to accompany the absence of forgiving
(e.g., Davenport, 1991; Fitzgibbons, 1986; McCullough et al.,
1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997), it is clear that
the lack of forgiving is at odds with psychological attachment.
Thus, these conflicting cognitions and feelings should also elicit
psychological tension.
Research Overview and Hypotheses
The preceding analysis provides a framework in which to un-
derstand (a) when forgiving is especially likely to be associated
with enhanced psychological well-being (i.e., when commitment is
strong) and (b) why the absence of forgiving might be associated
with reduced psychological well-being (i.e., it creates psycholog-
ical tension). On the basis of the interdependence framework
1 The construct of psychological tension is quite similar to well-known
constructs of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and imbalance (Hei-
der, 1958). We preferred to use the concept of psychological tension
because (a) it has often been used in the literatures of justice and helping
(where it has also been defined in terms of states of discomfort or distress
following a specific event or experience; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; for a
discussion, see Batson, 1998); (b) cognitive dissonance and imbalance are
obviously associated with cognitive consistency, whereas psychological
tension has a somewhat stronger affective connotation; and (c) the use of
the terms cognitive dissonance and imbalance may have unintentionally
conveyed the impression that the present research was designed to directly
test these theories.
Figure 1. Level of psychological tension as a function of four possible
situations created by weak versus strong levels of commitment and for-
giving present versus forgiving absent.
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outlined earlier, we advanced the following hypotheses. First, we
predicted that the positive association between forgiving and psy-
chological well-being would be more pronounced when commit-
ment to the offender is strong rather than weak (i.e., moderation-
by-commitment prediction; Hypothesis 1). (Of course, one could
also anticipate a positive, simple association between forgiving
and well-being, independent of an individual’s level of commit-
ment to the offender. We did not formally advance this hypothesis,
because we anticipated that this simple association would be
qualified by Hypothesis 1). Second, we predicted that the moder-
ation of the link between forgiving and well-being by commitment
is mediated by psychological tension (mediation-by-tension pre-
diction; Hypothesis 2). We report four studies that examined the
association between forgiving and well-being that provide prelim-
inary evidence relevant to this framework and the hypotheses
derived from it. Hypothesis 1 was tested in all studies, whereas
Hypothesis 2 was tested in Studies 2 and 3.
In Study 1 we used a paradigm in which participants are in-
structed to bring to mind a serious conflict with another person (cf.
McCullough et al., 1998; VanOyen Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander
Laan, 2001). The effects of forgiving were examined by asking
half of the participants to think about an offense that they had
forgiven the other and asking the other half to think about an
offense that they had not forgiven the other. Commitment was
assessed using Rusbult et al.’s (1998) instrument of commitment.
In Study 2, commitment was manipulated by asking participants to
imagine a conflict with a person to whom they felt weak versus
strong commitment and to imagine they had forgiven versus not
forgiven this person. Thus, this method seeks to activate feelings
and cognitions that are directly related to forgiving (or not forgiv-
ing) in combination with strong versus weak commitment (for
similar methodology, see Baldwin, 1995; Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr,
Enns, & Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996). In other words, we assumed that
within this 2 (forgiving vs. absence of forgiving)  2 (commit-
ment: strong vs. weak) framework, a participant’s thinking about
an interpersonal offense influences psychological tension, which,
in turn, influences psychological well-being. In Study 3, to further
examine the causal relationship between forgiving and well-being,
we used a paradigm that allowed us to actively manipulate forgiv-
ing by means of an alleged “forgiveness-test,” on which partici-
pants received (false) feedback whether they had forgiven or not
forgiven the offender. To provide complementary evidence for
Hypothesis 1, Study 4 examined whether the tendency to forgive
one’s spouse (i.e., a relationship characterized by strong levels of
commitment) would be more strongly related to psychological
well-being than the tendency to forgive others in general (i.e.,
including relationships ranging from weak to strong
interdependence).2
Study 1
The major purpose of Study 1 was to provide initial tests of
Hypotheses 1 and 2, using a paradigm in which participants were
asked to bring to mind an offense by another person whom they
have forgiven versus have not forgiven.
Method
Participants and design. Ninety students (30 men, 60 women; mean
age 21 years) participated in the experiment. They received a 5-guilder
(approximately $2.50 in U.S. currency) book token in exchange for their
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions. In the forgiving condition, they were asked to bring to mind a
conflict with another person whom they had forgiven; in the no-forgiving
condition, they were asked to bring to mind a conflict with another person
whom they had not forgiven. Level of commitment served as an indepen-
dent variable; however, because participants assigned themselves to vary-
ing levels of commitment, Study 1 does not address issues of causality
regarding this variable.
Procedure. Participants completed the questionnaires in individual
cubicles to ensure anonymity and minimize distraction. Forgiving was
manipulated by means of instructions, which read as follows (note that
these and all subsequent instructions reproduced in this article were orig-
inally in Dutch; our translations into English, made for use in this article,
appear throughout):
Every now and then, most or all people have had a conflict with
somebody else. The conflict can be relatively mild (e.g., a conflict that
you forget about easily), but the conflict can also be severe (i.e., a
conflict that you are unlikely to forget). We ask you to think about a
severe conflict that you had with someone [forgiving condition:
“which you have forgiven the other”; no-forgiving condition: “which
you have not forgiven the other”]. The other could be any person in
your social environment (i.e., friend, acquaintance), but it should not
be your intimate partner or a relative. Also, please keep in mind that
it concerns a conflict for which the other is to blame.
After receiving these instructions, participants were asked to write a
paragraph about the conflict with the other. The writing part served to
induce participants to bring to mind the conflict itself as well as the other
person who they believed had caused this conflict. Two features of these
above instructions deserve brief comment.
First, unlike previous research (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, &
Rachal, 1997), the instructions used the phrase “conflict for which the other
is to blame.” One important reason for using the word conflict instead of
the word offense is that there is no equivalent of the word offense in the
Dutch language (i.e., dictionary translations of offense tend to refer to
violations of the law, either as a very strong [and often sexual] violation
[vergrijp] or a more mild violation [overtreding]). A complementary rea-
son is that offenses often occur in the context of conflicts or conflicting
preferences (e.g., telling a secret about a friend might be somewhat
tempting for the storyteller because of entertainment value but is of course
very unpleasant to the friend in question); plus, when embedded in the
context of conflict, we assumed that it should be relatively easy for
participants to bring to mind an incident of unfair, hurtful, or otherwise
“bad” behavior by another person in their social environment.
Second, the instructions emphasized that participants should not bring to
mind conflicts with intimate partners (the Dutch instructions used the term
vaste partner, which includes dating relationships, cohabiting partnerships,
and marriage) or relatives. One important reason was that we wanted to
2 The present research does not address the causal links or feedback
loops among forgiveness, psychological well-being, and commitment.
Similar to the hypothesized links among commitment, trust, and pro-
relationship behavior (Wieselquist et al., 1999), we assumed that the causal
link between forgiveness and commitment, in particular, is likely to be
largely bidirectional. (Of lesser relevance, there is also reason to believe
that the link between forgiveness and well-being, if present, is bidirection-
al.) Although it is important to assess feedback loops among forgiveness,
well-being, and commitment (and perhaps additional constructs, such as
trust or avoidance), we leave such intricate issues up to future research—
after some evidence in support of the moderating role of commitment has
been obtained. We return to this issue in greater detail in the General
Discussion.
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examine relationships that are somewhat less exclusive than marriage,
dating relationships, or relationships with relatives. Indeed, such less
exclusive relationships, varying from strangers to acquaintances to best
friends, have received relatively little attention, even though conflicts occur
fairly frequently in such relationships, and individuals find it relatively
easy to bring to mind conflicts with fellow students, colleagues, or others
with whom they interact in their leisure time (see Van Lange, 1991).
Finally, we should note that the written descriptions of conflicts reflected
a wide variety of interpersonal offenses. Some examples are:
My friend and I planned to go on holiday together. A few weeks
before we were supposed to go, she canceled the vacation; later on, I
heard she went on vacation with someone else.
In the most important match of the year, my coach didn’t let me
play.
When I was abroad for a few months, a friend of mine promised to
write, but I did not receive any letters from him.
The assessment of features of conflict, commitment, and psychological
well-being. After participants completed writing about the conflict, they
were asked to complete several measures, all using 7-point scales (1 
completely disagree, 7  completely agree). First, for methodological
reasons, we wanted to explore whether features relevant to the conflict
itself and past circumstances differed among the four conditions. Hence,
we assessed (a) the perceived severity of conflict (three items, e.g., “The
conflict was very intense”;   .84), (b) a single-item measure of time of
conflict (“How long ago did the conflict take place?”).
Second, we assessed level of commitment to the offender, which was
measured with three items that focused on feelings of psychological
attachment (e.g., “I feel emotionally attached to the other”;   .96; in
Studies 2 and 3, discussed below, we assessed all three components of
commitment, including not only psychological attachment but also intent
to persist, long-term orientation, and attachment). Psychological well-
being was assessed with measures of life satisfaction, positive affect,
negative affect, and state self-esteem in an effort to capture different
aspects of this multifaceted construct (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999;
for evidence regarding the discriminant validity of these aspects of well-
being, see, e.g., Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996; Watson & Clark, 1991). Life
satisfaction was assessed with the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener,
1994; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), a five-item self-report
instrument that, as in many previous studies, exhibited good internal
consistency (  .78). Positive affect and negative affect were assessed
with the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). This instrument involves rating of 10 positive feelings
(  .84) and 10 negative feelings (  .91). For each item, participants
were asked to report the degree to which the item described how they were
feeling at that moment. Finally, self-esteem was assessed with the State
Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991); this instrument also ex-
hibited high internal consistency (  .92).
Results and Discussion
Possible correlates of forgiving. Given that participants were
asked to bring to mind an offense by another person whom they
either had forgiven or had not forgiven, it is conceivable that
forgiving is correlated with conflict severity (i.e., forgiven con-
flicts might be less severe) and time of conflict (e.g., forgiven
conflicts might have taken place longer ago). However, one-way
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed no significant differ-
ences between the forgiving condition and the no-forgiving con-
dition for (a) conflict severity (M  4.59, SD  1.68, and
M  4.77, SD  1.32), F(1, 88)  .33, ns, (b) time of conflict
(M  22.5 months ago, SD  26.93, and M  26.6 months ago,
SD  22.17), F(1, 81)  .89, ns.3 Thus, the manipulation of
forgiving did not appear to cause significant effects on variables
relevant to the conflict itself (severity, time).
Moderation by commitment: Hypothesis 1. We predicted that
the positive association between forgiving and psychological well-
being would be more pronounced when commitment to the of-
fender is strong rather than weak (i.e., moderation-by-commit-
ment; Hypothesis 1). To test this hypothesis, we conducted an
ANOVA, dichotomizing commitment in terms of weak commit-
ment (below-median means) and strong commitment (above-
median means; Mdn  2.83). Thus, the four measures of psycho-
logical well-being were analyzed by a 2 (forgiving vs. no-
forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong) ANOVA.
The four ANOVAs revealed some evidence for a main effect of
forgiving. Participants in the forgiving condition (M  5.00,
SD 0.88), exhibited greater life satisfaction than did participants
in the no-forgiving condition (M  4.57, SD  1.25), F(1,
86) 4.19, p .05. There were no significant main effects for the
other measures of well-being, F(1, 86) 3.38, 0.11, 1.78, all ps
.05, for positive affect, negative affect, and state self-esteem,
respectively. There was no main effect of commitment.
More important, and relevant to Hypothesis 1, the ANOVAs
revealed the predicted interaction of forgiving and commitment for
life satisfaction, positive affect, and state self-esteem, F(1,
86)  4.79, 13.84, and 4.11, respectively, all ps  .05 (see Table
1).4, 5 This interaction was marginal for negative affect, F(1,
86)  3.25, p  .10. Tests of simple main effects revealed that
when commitment was strong, participants in the forgiving con-
dition (vs. those in no-forgiving condition) exhibited greater levels
of life satisfaction, F(1, 86)  8.46, p  .005; positive affect, F(1,
86) 15.63, p .001; and state self-esteem, F(1, 86) 5.80, p
.05. However, when commitment to the other was weak, there
were no significant differences between the forgiving and no-
forgiving conditions on any of the measures of psychological
well-being: life satisfaction, F(1, 86)  .01, ns; positive affect,
F(1, 86)  1.14, ns; and state self-esteem, F(1, 86)  .08, ns. (For
negative affect, both simple main effects were not significant.)
3 Because of missing values, there was a drop in degrees of freedom
(from df  1, 88 to df  1, 81). Some participants misunderstood the
question and reported the range of time the conflict took place.
4 We also adopted a regression approach, whereby the measures of
psychological well-being were regressed onto forgiving versus no-
forgiving (dummy coded), level of commitment, and their interaction.
These analyses revealed virtually identical results as the ANOVAs. How-
ever, we preferred to report the ANOVAs here because the data of Study 2
were analyzed with ANOVAs (i.e., this study examined experimental
manipulations of commitment: weak vs. strong commitment), hence pro-
moting consistency of analyses across the studies.
5 To explore whether the features of the conflict might account for the
results, we conducted analyses in which severity of conflict and time of
conflict were included (separately and simultaneously) as covariates in
ANOVAs or as predictor variables in hierarchical regression analyses.
These analyses revealed that the interactions of forgiving and commitment
remained significant for life satisfaction and state self-esteem and remained
marginally significant for positive affect and negative affect, indicating that
severity of conflict and time of conflict did not account for the effects
relevant to the present hypotheses.
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Thus, Hypothesis 1 received good support for three of the four
measures of psychological well-being.
Study 2
Study 1 provided good support for Hypothesis 1. Consistent
with Hypothesis 1, we obtained moderation by commitment, re-
vealing that forgiving is positively associated with psychological
well-being but that this association is more pronounced when
relational commitment is strong rather than weak—in fact, there is
no association between forgiving and psychological well-being
when commitment is weak.
Study 2 extended Study 1 in at least two respects. First, because
Study 1 did not experimentally manipulate level of commitment,
we did not empirically address the issue of causality. In Study 2,
we used a substantially different method that is not sensitive to
self-selection processes. In this paradigm, participants were first
asked to bring to mind another person to whom they felt either
weak or strong commitment. Next, they were asked to imagine that
they have had a serious conflict with the other person and that they
have forgiven (vs. have not forgiven) the other person. Second,
unlike Study 1, Study 2 included a measure of psychological
tension to provide an initial test of Hypothesis 2, the prediction that
the positive association between forgiving and psychological well-
being when commitment is strong is mediated by psychological
tension.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred twenty students (34 men, 86
women, average age 21 years) participated in Study 2 in exchange for a
book token of 5 Dutch guilders ($2.50 in U.S. currency). The study used
a 2 (forgiving vs. no-forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong)
factorial design.
Procedure. After participants were welcomed in the psychology lab-
oratory, they were escorted to one of the 15 individual cubicles where they
completed the experiment. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the
first phase, commitment was manipulated by asking participants to think
about a person to whom they felt either strong commitment (in the strong
commitment condition) or to whom they felt only weak commitment (in
the weak commitment condition). In both conditions, the instructions stated
that they should not think of their intimate partner or a relative. They were
asked to write down that person’s initials, after which we assessed the level
of commitment they experienced with that person, using the eight-item
measure developed by Rusbult et al. (1991, 1998; for the present purposes,
this measure served as a manipulation check of commitment).
In the second phase, the presence or absence of forgiving was manipu-
lated by means of a scenario. Participants read the following scenario:
Imagine that you have had a serious conflict with the other, of whom
you just wrote down the initials. You think the other is to blame for
this conflict. Also, imagine that you have [in the forgiving condition:
“forgiven”; in the no-forgiving condition: “not forgiven”] the other.
The scenario was global and brief. We did not want to include further
information regarding the specific type of conflict or the reasons underly-
ing forgiving versus no-forgiving in order to avoid specific connotations or
framings of the scenario (e.g., different types of conflicts have different
meaning to different people). After reading these instructions, participants
completed the remaining part of the questionnaire, which assessed (a)
psychological tension and (b) the four measures of psychological well-
being (i.e., life satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect, and state
self-esteem). Before participants completed each of these measures of
psychological well-being, our written instructions asked them to place
themselves in the situation described in the scenario (i.e., “When answering
the following questions, imagine yourself in the described situation”).
Because forgiving was manipulated in the scenario itself (rather than that
participants were to bring to mind an incident of actual forgiving), we did
not include a measure of forgiving to check the effectiveness of the
manipulation.
The assessment of commitment, tension, and psychological well-being.
The instrument for measuring commitment was adapted from previous
research on commitment that has been conducted in the United States and
the Netherlands (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1991; Van Lange, Agnew, et al., 1997;
Van Lange, Otten, et al., 1997; for details, see Rusbult et al., 1998).
However, in previous research on commitment, the wording of several
items was closely related to dating relationships or marital relationships
(e.g., “I would really feel upset if our relationship were to end in the near
future”). We adjusted such wording in order to assess commitment in the
context of less exclusive relationships (e.g., “I would really feel upset if I
won’t have any contact with the other in the future”). As in previous
Table 1
Means of Different Indicators of Psychological Well-Being as a Function of Forgiving and Level
of Commitment (Study 1)
Psychological well-being
Level of Commitment
Weak Strong
Forgiving No forgiving Forgiving No forgiving
Satisfaction with life
M 4.77 4.81 5.11 4.11
SD 0.83 1.15 0.90 1.36
Positive affect
M 4.09 4.47 4.82 3.70
SD 1.04 1.00 0.71 0.90
Negative affect
M 2.43 1.96 2.04 2.37
SD 1.18 1.02 0.89 0.90
State self-esteem
M 4.99 5.15 5.42 4.66
SD 1.11 1.07 0.96 0.93
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research (see Rusbult et al., 1998), this instrument of commitment includes
items measuring intent to persist, long-term orientation, and psychological
attachment (eight items,  .97).
For the measurement of psychological tension, we developed a scale
consisting of nine items that tapped the conflicting feelings and cognitions
resulting from thinking about the specific situation of having forgiven
versus having not forgiven a person to whom one felt weak versus strong
commitment. The introductory line, “When I think about the extent to
which I’ve forgiven the other, to whom I am weakly [vs. “strongly”]
committed . . . ” was followed by nine statements (e.g., “ . . . I experience
conflicting feelings,” “ . . . this evokes tension,” and “ . . . this is bothering
me”;   .88).
Psychological well-being was assessed with measures of satisfaction
with life ( .85), positive affect ( .78), negative affect ( .90), and
state self-esteem (  .91). The measurement of these constructs was
identical to the measurements used in Studies 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. To check whether the manipulation of
commitment was successful, we conducted an ANOVA with for-
giving (forgiving vs. no-forgiving) and commitment (strong vs.
weak) as independent variables, using the reported level of com-
mitment as dependent variable. This analysis revealed a strong
main effect of commitment, F(1, 116)  560.96, p  .001,
indicating greater mean levels of commitment in the strong com-
mitment condition (M  5.80, SD  0.71) than in the weak
commitment condition (M  2.34, SD  0.87). The main effect of
forgiving, F(1, 116)  .157, ns, and the interaction effect of
commitment and forgiving, F(1, 116)  .02, ns, were not signif-
icant. Thus, the manipulation caused the intended effects on
commitment.
Moderation by commitment: Hypothesis 1. To test Hypothe-
sis 1, we performed a 2 (forgiving instructions: forgiving vs.
no-forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong) ANOVA for
each measure of psychological well-being. No main effects for
forgiving or commitment were significant for each of the measures
of well-being. However, these analyses revealed the predicted
interaction between forgiving instructions and commitment for life
satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect, and state self-esteem
(for means, see Table 2; for F values, see Table 3). According to
Hypothesis 1, the interaction should be largely due to significant
simple main effects within the strong commitment condition rather
than within the weak commitment condition.
Tests for simple main effects revealed that within the strong
commitment condition, participants in the forgiving condition
compared with the no-forgiving condition exhibited greater levels
of life satisfaction, F(1, 116)  8.12, p  .005; positive affect,
F(1, 116) 7.97, p .01; and state self-esteem, F(1, 116) 4.25,
p .05; and lower levels of negative affect, F(1, 116) 8.12, p
.005. In contrast, within the weak commitment condition, there
were no significant differences between the forgiving and no-
forgiving conditions for life satisfaction, positive affect, and neg-
ative affect (for F values, see Table 3). These obtained patterns
again provide evidence for Hypothesis 1.
There was one unexpected finding of the forgiving instructions.
As can be seen in Table 2, participants exhibited higher levels of
state self-esteem when they imagined that they had not forgiven
rather than had forgiven the other to whom they were weakly
committed, F(1, 116)  5.52, p  .05. This indicates that forgiv-
ing might even be related to lower levels of self-esteem rather than
higher self-esteem when commitment to the other is weak.
Mediation by psychological tension: Hypothesis 2. According
to Baron and Kenny (1986), when the interactive effect of two
initial variables (i.e., forgiving and commitment) on an outcome
variable (i.e., psychological tension) is mediated by the effect of a
process variable (i.e., psychological tension), this is referred to as
mediated moderation. To examine whether psychological tension
mediated the interaction effect of forgiving and commitment, four
steps should be followed. First, it should be demonstrated that
there is an interaction effect of forgiving and commitment on
psychological well-being. The preceding analyses reveal that this
Table 2
Means of Different Indicators of Psychological Well-Being and Psychological Tension as a
Function of Forgiving and Level of Commitment (Study 2)
Psychological well-being
Level of commitment
Weak Strong
Forgiving No forgiving Forgiving No forgiving
Satisfaction with life
M 4.55 4.97 4.74 3.87
SD 1.28 1.02 1.12 1.29
Positive affect
M 3.78 4.12 4.08 3.49
SD 0.71 0.91 0.92 0.74
Negative affect
M 3.37 2.81 3.37 4.22
SD 1.18 0.96 1.38 1.02
State self-esteem
M 4.75 5.32 4.91 4.43
SD 1.04 0.80 0.83 0.96
Psychological tension
M 4.41 4.15 4.56 5.61
SD 1.05 1.14 1.13 0.80
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interaction effect was significant for life satisfaction and state
self-esteem and marginal for negative affect and positive affect.
Second, the interaction effect of forgiving and commitment on
psychological tension should be significant. We conducted a 2
(forgiving vs. no forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong)
ANOVA for psychological tension. This analysis revealed a main
effect of commitment, F(1, 116)  19.05, p  .001; a main effect
of forgiving, F(1, 116)  3.95, p  .05; and the predicted inter-
action of commitment and forgiving, F(1, 116)  11.27, p  .001
(for means, see Table 2). Tests of simple main effects revealed a
pattern identical to those observed for the measures of psycholog-
ical well-being. That is, within the strong commitment condition,
psychological tension was higher in the no-forgiving condition
than in the forgiving condition, F(1, 116)  13.06, p  .001,
whereas there was no significant difference within the weak com-
mitment condition, F(1, 116)  .81, ns.
In the third step, it should be shown that psychological tension
has a significant effect on the measures of psychological well-
being while controlling for the interaction of forgiving and com-
mitment. Therefore, state self-esteem, life satisfaction, negative
affect, and positive affect were each, in turn, regressed simulta-
neously onto forgiving, commitment, their interaction, and psy-
chological tension. These analyses revealed that psychological
tension was significantly associated with state self-esteem ( 
.39), t(117)  4.12, p  .001; life satisfaction (  .22),
t(117)  2.20, p  .05; and negative affect (  .59),
t(117)  7.25, p  .001. Psychological tension was not signifi-
cantly associated with positive affect (.12), t(117)1.18,
ns. As a final and fourth step, to examine whether the interaction
effect of forgiving and commitment on the measures of psycho-
logical well-being was mediated by psychological tension, we
performed separate 2 (forgiving vs. no forgiving)  2 (commit-
ment: weak vs. strong) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) for
life satisfaction, state self-esteem, and negative affect, adding
psychological tension as a covariate. As can be seen in Table 3, the
interaction effect of forgiving and commitment was no longer
significant for life satisfaction (Z  1.90, p  .05), state self-
esteem (Z  2.65, p  .01), and negative affect (Z  3.07, p 
.01), and these reductions were significant. These findings provide
good support for Hypothesis 2, predicting mediation by psycho-
logical tension.
It is important to note that these analyses revealed that the F
values of the simple main effects within strong commitment
strongly declined for these three measures of psychological well-
being (see also Table 3). The F values of the simple main effects
within the weak commitment condition were not affected by
psychological tension.
Study 3
Study 2 revealed good evidence in support of Hypotheses 1
and 2. In support of the moderation-by-commitment prediction
(Hypothesis 1) and consistent with the results of Study 1, forgiving
was associated with well-being but only when commitment to the
offender was strong. Moreover, Study 2 extended Study 1 by
providing an initial test concerning the causal direction of the
association between forgiving and psychological well-being. As
predicted, imagining that one has not forgiven a person to whom
one experiences strong commitment was associated with higher
levels of psychological tension, which mediated the interaction of
forgiving and commitment on psychological well-being (Hypoth-
esis 2).
Although results of Studies 1 and 2 supported the hypotheses,
we should note some limitations that are inherent to the scenario-
based methodology that we used in Study 2. That is, participants
were asked to place themselves in hypothetical situations in which
they were asked to imagine that they had versus had not forgiven
another person. It is possible that such scenarios give rise to
demand characteristics or complementary self-report tendencies,
even if the scenario-based design is a between-participants design.
There also may be a substantial difference between effects caused
by imagined level of forgiveness versus actually experienced level
Table 3
F Values of the Interactions Between Forgiving and Commitment Without and With
Psychological Tension Included as Covariate, and F Values of Simple Main Effects Within Weak
and Strong Commitment Without and With Psychological Tension Included as Covariate (Study 2)
Psychological well-being
Forgiving  Commitment
interaction
Simple main effects
Within weak
commitment
Within strong
commitment
Satisfaction with life
Without tension 8.86*** 1.87 8.12***
With tension 4.75* 1.35 3.26
Positive affect
Without tension 9.72*** 2.61 7.97**
With tension 6.82** 2.23 4.75*
Negative affect
Without tension 11.21*** 3.24 8.12***
With tension 2.63 2.44 0.23
State self-esteem
Without tension 9.69*** 5.52* 4.25*
With tension 3.67 4.63* 0.33
Note. For Without tension values, dfs  1, 117; for With tension values, dfs  1, 116.
* p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .005.
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of forgiveness. Hence, it is not clear whether reports of tension and
psychological well-being would be similarly affected if forgive-
ness were manipulated in a more realistic, or active, manner—that
is, when participants believe that they have actually largely for-
given (or not) the other.
Study 3 complements Studies 1 and 2 by using a paradigm that
allowed us to actively manipulate forgiveness. Participants were,
as in Study 1, asked to bring to mind an incident in which they
were offended. Next, participants completed an alleged
forgiveness-test, using a version of the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). After completing
the IAT, participants received information regarding the rationale
of the IAT (including the “implicitness” of this test) as well as
false feedback regarding the degree to which they had forgiven the
offender. We assumed that participants would be somewhat un-
certain about their level of forgiveness, especially the implicit
aspects of forgiveness.
Method
Participants and design. The participants were 136 (45 men, 91
women, average age 21 years) undergraduate students from the Free
University, Amsterdam. They participated in exchange for 5 Dutch guil-
ders ($2.50 in U.S. currency) and were randomly assigned to one of the two
experimental (forgiving vs. no forgiving) conditions.
Procedure. After they were welcomed in the psychology laboratory,
participants were escorted to individual cubicles, where they received
instructions by means of a computer. Participants were asked to bring to
mind a severe conflict they had had with someone for which they felt the
other was to blame. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, the instructions did not state
that they should not think of conflicts with relatives or dating partners,
allowing participants to bring to mind a relatively more extended range of
relationships. After they had written a brief paragraph about the conflict,
they were asked to type in the first name of the offender (as will be
explained shortly, the first name of the offender was used later in the
experiment for the manipulation of forgiveness). As in Studies 1 and 2, we
measured conflict severity (three items;  .90) and time of conflict (with
a single-item scale assessing how long ago the conflict took place).
Next, using the same eight items as in Study 2, we assessed commitment
(  .96). We assessed rather than experimentally manipulated level of
commitment for several reasons. First, by manipulating commitment, one
might enhance the salience of aspects of commitment (intent to persist,
long-term orientation, and attachment), thereby possibly giving rise to
demand characteristics or related self-report tendencies. Second, we had
already conducted two studies in which we examined the effects of ma-
nipulated commitment (i.e., Study 2 and the study described in Footnote 7).
And finally, the extension of Study 3 over Studies 1 and 2 derives from the
active manipulation of forgiveness, and hence we did not want to add
another explicit manipulation or instruction to the fairly extended manip-
ulation of forgiveness, as we discuss below.
Manipulation of forgiveness. After participants had completed these
measures, instructions stated the following:
In recent years, researchers in the field of psychology have become
more and more interested in the topic of forgiveness. Because it
appears that people have difficulty indicating the extent to which they
have forgiven an offender, prominent researchers have developed a
reliable and validated test, which allows researchers to assess the
degree to which a person has forgiven an offender.
As noted earlier, the forgiveness-test was a version of the IAT, which is
designed to assess differential associations between two target concepts
(e.g., black and white) and an attribute (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant
objects) through tasks in which reaction times are assessed and compared
(for a detailed description, see Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 3, the IAT
was not used to assess reaction times but as a diagnostic device for
assessing level of forgiveness—that is, after a careful explanation of the
IAT, we provided participants with false feedback concerning their level of
forgiveness.
Instructions stated that the forgiveness-test consisted of different sub-
tasks in which participants were to identify as quickly as possible a
particular word that would appear on their computer screen. In the first
task, it was explained that seven different names would appear in random
order on the computer screen, one of which was the first name of the
offender (which the participant had typed in earlier in this experiment).
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible by pushing a
specified left-hand key (i.e., the “A”) when the name of the offender
appeared on the screen (which happened six times) and to respond as
quickly as possible by pushing a specified right-hand key (i.e., the “6”)
when a name other than the name of the offender appeared (each of the six
other names appeared once). In the second task, 12 words appeared on the
screen, 6 of which were words with positive valence (e.g., love, paradise)
and 6 of which were words with negative valence (e.g., unjust, lying).
Instructions stated that the left-hand key should be pushed as quickly as
possible when a positive word appeared on the screen, and the right-hand
key should be pushed as quickly as possible when a negative word
appeared on the screen. The third task instructed participants to respond as
quickly as possible by pushing the left-hand key when either a positive
word or the name of the offender appeared on the screen and by pushing
the right-hand key when either a negative word or a name of a person other
than the offender appeared on the screen. Finally, the fourth task instructed
participants to respond as quickly as possible by pushing the left-hand key
when either a negative word or the name of the offender appeared on the
screen and by pushing the right-hand key when either a positive word or a
name of a person other than the offender appeared on the screen.
After participants completed this task, the rationale for the forgiveness-
test was explained. It was stated that prior research had revealed that, when
a person largely has forgiven an offender, associations between positive
words and the name of the offender are relatively stronger than associations
between negative words and the name of the offender. Conversely, when a
person largely has not forgiven the offender, associations between negative
words and the name of the offender are relatively stronger. Participants
were also informed about the fact that these associations can be measured
through reaction times. The “implicitness” of the IAT was underlined by
noting that the test examines “automatic associations” and exhibits corre-
lations with several physiological measures, such as blood pressure, heart
rate, and galvanic skin response, which also tend to be correlated with
forgiveness.
As alluded to earlier, the reaction times were not actually measured, but
participants received false feedback concerning their reaction times. In the
forgiving condition, participants were led to believe that the result of the
test revealed that they had responded faster (567 ms on average) in the third
task, in which they were asked to respond with the same key to positive
words and the name of the offender, than in the fourth task, in which they
were asked to respond with the same key to negative words and the name
of the offender (734 ms on average). The instructions read: “As your
reaction times reveal, the associations between the other person and pos-
itive words are relatively stronger. On the basis of these results, it seems
that you have forgiven the offender.”
In the no-forgiving condition, participants were led to believe that the
results revealed that they had responded faster in the name of the
offender/negative words task (i.e., 567 ms on average) than in the name
of the offender/positive words task (i.e., 734 ms on average). The
instructions read: “As your reaction times reveal, the associations
between the other person and negative words are relatively stronger. On
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the basis of these results, it seems that you have not entirely forgiven
the offender.”
Assessment of psychological tension and psychological well-being.
After the participant received information about his or her forgiveness,
several measures were administered. First, participants completed a similar
scale as used in Study 2 to assess psychological tension. However, unlike
Study 2, we did not include the introductory line, which explicitly asked
participants how they currently felt when thinking about their level of
commitment with the offender and the extent to which they had forgiven
the offender. Instead, participants were simply asked to indicate the extent
to which they currently experienced certain feelings (nine items: e.g.,
tension, conflicting feelings, restlessness;   .92).
Second, as in Studies 1 and 2, we examined psychological well-being by
assessing life satisfaction (  .82), positive affect (  .83), negative
affect (  .91), and state self-esteem (  .89). For all measures, 7-point
scales were used (1  completely disagree, 7  completely agree).
As a manipulation check, participants were asked whether, according to
the test, they had forgiven or not forgiven the offender. In addition,
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt they had
forgiven the other (1  completely not forgiven, 7  completely forgiven),
thereby trying not to take into consideration the result of the forgiveness-
test (i.e., level of forgiveness). Finally, a two-item scale measured the
degree to which participants agreed with the result of the forgiveness-test
(“I agree with the result of the forgiveness-test”; “I think the result of the
forgiveness-test was right”;   .92).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive analyses. Participants reported offenses commit-
ted by a wide range of others, including dating partners (15.4%),
friends (19.1%), relatives (24.2%), and others categorized as
“other” (41.2%). On average, participants brought to mind rela-
tively serious offenses (M  4.78, SD  1.54), and the offense
took place on average 9 weeks ago (M  9.02, SD  27.83).
Manipulation check. All participants answered correctly the
question about whether they had, according to the test result,
forgiven or not entirely forgiven the offender. In addition, we
conducted an ANOVA with level of experienced forgiveness as
dependent variable, and forgiveness condition (forgiving vs. no-
forgiving feedback) and commitment (weak vs. strong) as inde-
pendent variables. The latter variable was dichotomized in terms of
weak commitment (below-median means) and strong commitment
(above-median means; Mdn 4.44). This analysis revealed a main
effect of forgiving, F(1, 135)  7.32, p  .01, indicating greater
level of forgiveness in the forgiveness condition (M  4.76,
SD  2.04) than in the no-forgiveness condition (M  3.85,
SD  2.17). This provides good support for the intended effects
caused by the experimental manipulation of forgiveness. The anal-
ysis also revealed a main effect of commitment, F(1,
135)  14.03, p  .001, indicating a greater level of forgiveness
when participants experienced strong commitment (M  4.97,
SD  2.06) rather than weak commitment (M  3.68, SD  2.04)
to the offender. This finding is consistent with the findings of
Study 1 and with earlier research (e.g., Finkel et al., 2002; Mc-
Cullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Finally, there was no
significant interaction between forgiveness condition and commit-
ment, F(1, 135)  0.40, ns, indicating that the two independent
variables exert only additive effects on level of experienced
forgiveness.
Moderation by commitment: Hypothesis 1. To test Hypothe-
sis 1, we conducted a 2 (forgiveness condition: forgiving vs.
no-forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong) ANOVA for
each measure of psychological well-being. These analyses re-
vealed the predicted significant interactions of forgiving and com-
mitment for state self-esteem and negative affect (for means, see
Table 4; for F values, see Table 5). Only when commitment to the
offender was strong was the simple main effect of forgiving
condition significant. Relative to participants in the no-forgiveness
condition, participants in the forgiveness condition reported
greater levels of state self-esteem and lower levels of negative
affect. No such significant effects were obtained when commit-
ment was weak.
Table 4
Means of Different Indicators of Psychological Well-Being and Psychological Tension as a
Function of Forgiving and Level of Commitment (Study 3)
Psychological well-being
Level of commitment
Weak Strong
Forgiving No forgiving Forgiving No forgiving
Satisfaction with life
M 4.93 4.71 4.84 4.76
SD 0.98 1.17 1.20 1.08
Positive affect
M 4.83 4.55 4.68 4.14
SD 0.73 0.91 0.80 0.75
Negative affect
M 2.41 2.08 2.38 3.08
SD 0.99 1.02 0.92 0.91
State self-esteem
M 5.11 5.20 5.10 4.59
SD 0.72 0.83 0.93 0.79
Psychological tension
M 3.20 2.77 2.92 4.08
SD 1.25 1.18 1.28 1.17
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Although the interaction of forgiving and commitment for pos-
itive affect did not reach significance (and thus no significant
moderation by commitment), further inspection of simple main
effects revealed a pattern that is congruent with the expectations
(for means, see Table 4; for F values, see Table 5). Specifically,
when commitment was strong, level of positive affect was signif-
icantly higher in the forgiving condition than in the no-forgiving
condition, whereas no such significant effects were observed when
commitment to the offender was weak. For life satisfaction, neither
the interaction effect of forgiving and commitment nor the simple
main effects were significant.
Mediation by psychological tension: Hypothesis 2. The same
four steps as in Study 2 were performed to establish mediated
moderation. First, the preceding analyses revealed that the inter-
action effect of forgiving and commitment was obtained for the
measures of state self-esteem and negative affect. Second, a 2
(forgiving vs. no forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong)
ANOVA for psychological tension revealed a significant main
effect of commitment, F(1, 135)  5.40, p  .05. However, this
effect was qualified by the predicted interaction effect of forgiving
and commitment, F(1, 135)  12.72, p  .001 (for means, see
Table 4). Tests of simple main effects revealed that when com-
mitment was weak, there was no significant effect of forgiving
condition on psychological tension, F(1, 135)  0.77, ns. When
commitment to the offender was strong, participants in the no-
forgiving condition reported higher levels of psychological tension
than did participants in the forgiving condition, F(1, 135) 16.56,
p  .001.
Third, negative affect and state self-esteem were each, in turn,
regressed simultaneously onto forgiving, commitment, their inter-
action, and psychological tension. These analyses revealed that
psychological tension was indeed correlated with state self-esteem
(  .34), t(136)  3.95, p  .001, and correlated with negative
affect ( .71), t(136)  11.55, p  .001. As a final and fourth
step, to test the hypothesis that the interaction of forgiving and
commitment on well-being is mediated by psychological tension,
we performed 2 (forgiving vs. no-forgiving)  2 (commitment:
weak vs. strong) ANOVAs for state self-esteem and negative
affect separately, including psychological tension as a covariate.
The interaction of forgiving and commitment for state self-esteem
dropped to nonsignificance, F(1, 134)  0.89, ns, and this reduc-
tion was significant (Z  2.60, p  .01). Similarly, for negative
affect, the interaction of forgiving and commitment dropped to
nonsignificance, F(1, 134)  0.61, ns, and this reduction was
significant (Z  3.40, p  .01). It is important to note that as can
be seen in Table 5, the F values of the simple main effects strongly
declined when commitment to the offender was strong and were
not affected by psychological tension when commitment to the
offender was weak.
Because the interaction of forgiving and commitment was not
significant for positive affect, this interaction could thus not be
mediated by psychological tension. However, in a more explor-
atory vein, we examined whether the significant simple main effect
of forgiveness condition within strong commitment was mediated
by psychological tension. When controlling for forgiving, com-
mitment, and their interaction, a regression analysis revealed that
psychological tension was significantly correlated with positive
affect (  .23), t(136)  2.67, p  .01. When psychological
tension was included as a covariate in the 2 (forgiving vs. no
forgiving)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong) ANCOVA for
positive affect, when commitment to the offender was strong, the
simple main effect of forgiving condition was no longer signifi-
cant, F(1, 134)  3.05, p  .08, yielding a significant reduction
(Z  2.13, p  .05).
Tension through disagreement as an alternative explanation.
Is it possible that psychological tension is caused to some extent by
disagreeing with the test results (e.g., when one thinks that he or
she has forgiven the offender whereas the test results suggest
otherwise, especially when commitment is strong)? And might
tension rooted in disagreement with the test results account for the
present findings? We conducted a 2 (forgiving vs. no-forgiv-
ing)  2 (commitment: weak vs. strong) ANOVA for level of
Table 5
F Values of the Interactions Between Forgiving and Commitment Without and With
Psychological Tension Included as Covariate, and F Values of Simple Main Effects Within Weak
and Strong Commitment Without and With Psychological Tension Included as Covariate (Study 3)
Psychological well-being
Forgiving  Commitment
interaction
Simple main effects
Within weak
commitment
Within strong
commitment
Satisfaction with life
Without tension 0.13 0.64 0.08
With tension 0.66 0.95 0.04
Positive affect
Without tension 0.90 2.20 7.21**
With tension 0.02 3.41 3.05
Negative affect
Without tension 9.69** 1.51 8.28**
With tension 0.61 0.22 0.16
State self-esteem
Without tension 4.42* 0.11 6.07*
With tension 0.89 0.01 1.52
Note. For Without tension values, dfs  1, 135; for With tension values, dfs  1, 134.
* p  .05. ** p  .01.
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agreement with the test results. This analysis revealed a main
effect of forgiveness condition, F(1, 135) 9.13, p .005, as well
as an interaction between forgiveness condition and commitment,
F(1, 135)  10.23, p  .005. Test of simple main effects revealed
that when commitment was strong, level of agreement was indeed
lower in the no-forgiving condition (M 3.50, SD 1.90) than in
the forgiving condition (M 5.46, SD 1.74), F(1, 135) 19.12,
p  .001. When commitment was weak, there was no significant
effect of level of agreement between the forgiving (M  4.82,
SD 1.43) and the no-forgiving (M 4.88, SD 2.23) condition,
F(1, 135) .01, ns. Thus, level of agreement was indeed relatively
low in the no-forgiving condition when commitment was strong.
However, ANOVAs in which level of agreement was included
as a covariate revealed no evidence in support of a significant
reduction in the variance accounted for by the interaction between
forgiveness condition and commitment, for negative affect, F(1,
134)  9.90, p  .01; without level of agreement, F(1,
135) 9.69, p .01; state self-esteem, F(1, 134) 4.22, p .05;
without level of agreement, F(1, 135)  4.42, p  .05; as well as
the presumed mediator itself, psychological tension, F(1,
134)  10.66, p  .001; without level of agreement, F(1,
135)  12.72, p  .001. Thus, the interaction effect between
forgiveness condition and commitment was not accounted for by
level of agreement with the test results.
To summarize, in support of Hypothesis 1 predicting modera-
tion by commitment, the present findings yielded a significant
interaction effect between the forgiveness condition and commit-
ment for negative affect and state self-esteem. Moreover, this
interaction was also significant for psychological tension. More-
over, in support of Hypothesis 2 predicting mediation by psycho-
logical tension, the significant interactions dropped to nonsignifi-
cance for negative affect and state self-esteem when psychological
tension was included as a covariate, supporting complete media-
tion rather than partial mediation by psychological tension. Al-
though we did not obtain a significant interaction of commitment
and forgiveness for positive affect, simple main effects analyses
revealed patterns that were at least in the predicted direction. Life
satisfaction was the only variable that failed to support Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2; perhaps this variable is more stable over time and
across situations than state self-esteem, negative affect, or positive
affect. Finally, the evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2
could not be accounted for by level of agreement with the test
results.6
Study 4
Consistent with our framework, Studies 1–3 provide good evi-
dence in support of the claim that the benefits of forgiving are
partner specific: Forgiving is associated with psychological well-
being, but only when the partner (i.e., offender) is someone to
whom the person is strongly committed (i.e., Hypothesis 1). The
findings of Studies 1–3 are based on methods in which participants
were asked to bring to mind (or, in Study 2, to imagine) a specific
conflict (cf. McCullough et al., 1998; VanOyen Witvliet et al.,
2001). In Study 4, we sought to provide complementary evidence
for Hypothesis 1 by examining the link between tendencies to
forgive (rather than forgiving of a specific offense) and psycho-
logical well-being. Moreover, Study 4 complements the findings
of Studies 1–3, which were based on students who had brought to
mind conflicts with dating partners, friends, and fellow students,
by examining the association between forgiving and psychological
well-being in the context of marital relationships.
Study 4 examined the effects of the distinction between (a) the
tendency to forgive others across multiple interaction partners (i.e.,
general forgiveness), and (b) the tendency to forgive one’s spouse
(i.e., partner-specific forgiveness; see Fincham, 2000; for a similar
distinction, see McCullough, Hoyt, & Rachal, 2000). General
forgiveness refers to the tendency to forgive others, irrespective of
whether these others are partners to whom one experiences weak
or strong levels of commitment—indeed, it generalizes across
levels of commitment (cf. McCullough, Hoyt, & Rachal, 2000). In
contrast, relative to other specific partners, a spouse is obviously a
partner to whom one is generally strongly committed in terms of
intent to persist, long-term orientation, and psychological attach-
ment (cf. Agnew et al., 1998). Thus, in line with our reasoning that
the beneficial effects of forgiving are partner specific (i.e., forgiv-
ing is beneficial when commitment to the partner is strong), we
predicted that the tendency to forgive one’s spouse would exhibit
stronger associations with psychological well-being than the ten-
dency to forgive others in general, irrespective of level of com-
mitment to the other.
Method
Participants and procedure. The initial sample consisted of 166 het-
erosexual couples who participated in a large research program on the
division of labor. Spouses received identical questionnaires at home in
separate envelopes. They were instructed not to discuss the questionnaire
with the spouse until each had completed it and returned it in separate
envelopes. One hundred nineteen couples returned the questionnaires and
received a research report in return for their participation. These couples
had been involved in their relationship for 10 years and 3 months on
average. The mean ages of men and women were 36.38 years (SD  4.23)
and 33.69 years (SD  3.25), respectively.
Measurements. Using a five-item modified version of the commitment
scale as used in the previous studies, commitment to the relationship
partner was assessed. Internal consistency was acceptable (  .72).
Participants responded on 9-point scales. As presumed, levels of commit-
ment were strong (M 7.76, SD 1.04). More than 98% scored above the
midpoint of scale.
Partner-specific forgiveness and general forgiveness were assessed with
a single-item scale (respectively, “To what extent are you, in general,
forgiving toward your partner?” and “To what extent are you, in general,
forgiving toward others [other than your partner]?”). Participants indicated
on 9-point scales tendencies to forgive.
6 We also conducted another study that deserves brief discussion. Using
a method that is similar to Study 1, we examined four conditions by
instructing participants to bring to mind a conflict that they had either
forgiven or not forgiven with another person to whom they experienced
either weak or strong commitment (see Figure 1). Also, as in Studies 2
and 3, we assessed psychological tension. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, as
well as with the findings of Studies 1–3, this study revealed significant
interactions of forgiving and commitment for life satisfaction and state
self-esteem and marginal interaction effects for negative affect and positive
affect. Moreover, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the interactions for state
self-esteem, life satisfaction, and negative affect were mediated by psy-
chological tension. Thus, the findings of this study also provided good
support for our hypotheses. The interested reader could contact Johan C.
Karremans for more detailed information regarding this study.
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The Satisfaction With Life Scale was used as an indicator of psycho-
logical well-being (  .88).
Results
The data obtained in this study are not statistically independent.
To address the problem of nonindependence, we analyzed the data
at the individual level separately for men and women.
Partner-specific forgiveness was significantly positively corre-
lated with life satisfaction (for men, r  .41, p  .01; for women,
r  .31, p  .01). General forgiveness and life satisfaction were
not significantly correlated (for men, r .16, p .10; for women,
r  .15, p  .12). We tested our hypothesis with a test given by
Steiger (1980). This analysis revealed that the correlation between
partner-specific forgiveness and life satisfaction was indeed stron-
ger than the correlation between general forgiveness and life
satisfaction, both for men, t(112)  2.25, p  .05, and for women,
t(112)  2.28, p  .05.
Of lesser relevance, correlational analysis revealed that partner-
specific forgiveness and general forgiveness were modestly corre-
lated for both men (r  .19, p  .05) and women (r  .25, p 
.01). Moreover, exploratory analyses revealed that partner-specific
forgiveness was correlated between men and women (r .23, p
.05). Also, life satisfaction was correlated between men and
women (r  .39, p  .01).
Thus, these findings confirm our hypothesis that a tendency to
forgive one’s spouse (i.e., someone to whom one experiences
strong levels of commitment) is more strongly related to psycho-
logical well-being than a tendency to forgive others in general.
Again, these findings suggest that the beneficial effects of forgive-
ness are relationship-specific.7
General Discussion
The major purpose of the present research was to illuminate our
understanding of when and why forgiving might be associated
with enhanced psychological well-being. Using principles of in-
terdependence theory and previous research on commitment in
relationships, we suggested that the presumed link between for-
giving and psychological well-being could be understood in terms
of interdependence features underlying the relationship between
the person and the offender. As such, the present research sought
to extend the young literature on forgiving, which has devoted
relatively little attention to the relationship-specific variables that
might contribute to understanding of whether forgiving is posi-
tively associated with psychological well-being. In the following
paragraphs, we discuss the major findings of the present research
and outline several implications of this research.
We advanced the prediction that this association would be more
pronounced when commitment is strong than when commitment is
weak (Hypothesis 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Studies 1–3
revealed significant interactions of forgiving and commitment on
psychological well-being (across the three studies, 10 of the 12
interactions of forgiving and commitment were marginal or sig-
nificant). Complementary analyses revealed that forgiving was
only associated with psychological well-being when commitment
was strong (11 of 12 simple main effects within strong commit-
ment were marginal or significant) but not when commitment was
weak (none of the 12 simple main effects within weak commit-
ment were marginal or significant). This pattern was observed
across conceptually and empirically distinct measures of psycho-
logical well-being: life satisfaction (Studies 1 and 2), positive
affect (Studies 1 and 3), negative affect (Studies 2 and 3), and state
self-esteem (Studies 1–3).
These findings are consistent with the notion, derived from
interdependence theory, that interpersonal variables are essential to
the understanding of whether or not forgiving promotes psycho-
logical well-being. Forgiving does not occur in an interpersonal
vacuum. Indeed, as the present findings indicate, the psychological
consequences of forgiving need to be considered in light of one’s
commitment, which is rooted in a history of social interaction and
which guides processes, behavior, and interactions that are rele-
vant to the future of the relationship (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).
Interdependence frameworks have often been used to understand
behavior and interactions such as cooperation, sacrifice, and ac-
commodation (Kelley, 1997; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult et
al., 1991; Van Lange, Otten, et al., 1997). As such, the present
research complements previous research by indicating that con-
cepts focusing on circumstances of interdependence and history of
interactions are essential to the understanding of not only behavior
and interactions but also intrapersonal outcomes, that is, psycho-
logical well-being.
The present research also sought to extend previous research on
forgiving by examining why forgiving might be associated with
psychological well-being. We suggested that the combination of
strong commitment and absence of forgiving contributes to psy-
chological tension, which might explain reduced levels of psycho-
logical well-being. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Studies 2 and 3
revealed that psychological tension (i.e., a psychological state of
discomfort due to conflicting cognitions and feelings) mediated the
interactive impact of both commitment and forgiving on the mea-
sures of psychological well-being. Specifically, failure to forgive
others to whom we feel strong commitment elicited reduced levels
of life satisfaction and state self-esteem as well as higher levels of
negative affect; these effects disappeared when psychological ten-
sion was included as a covariate (see Tables 3 and 5; the evidence
was weaker or absent for positive affect in both studies and absent
for life satisfaction in Study 3). We suggested that failure to
forgive is at conflict with each of three basic components of
7 In a different study, using a similar methodology, we asked 91 partic-
ipants to indicate on six-item scales (a) their tendency to forgive their most
significant other (i.e., someone to whom one experiences strong levels of
commitment) in their lives (  .71) and (b) their tendency to forgive
others in general (not including the most significant other;  .78). Of the
significant others named, 32% were intimate partners, 26% close friends,
28% parents, 10% siblings, and 4% were unclassified. Satisfaction with life
served as an indicator of psychological well-being. In line with the results
of Study 4, the tendency to forgive one’s most significant other was
significantly correlated with life satisfaction (r  .23, p  .05), whereas
the tendency to forgive others in general was not significantly correlated
with life satisfaction (r .09, ns). The correlation between the tendency to
forgive one’s most significant other was marginally stronger than the
correlation between the tendency to forgive others in general, t(91) 1.41,
p  .10. Thus, as in Study 4, this study indicated that the tendency to
forgive someone to whom one is strongly committed is more strongly
related to psychological well-being than the tendency to forgive others in
general.
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commitment: intent to persist, long-term orientation, and psycho-
logical attachment. Psychological tension may be due to the fact
that failure to forgive forms a serious threat to (a) the stability and
vitality of the relationship (i.e., which is at odds with intent to
persist), (b) a basic level of trust and positive reciprocity (i.e., two
basic ingredients of long-term orientation), and (c) feelings of
psychological attachment (cf. Agnew et al., 1998; Aron & Aron,
1997; Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997; Wieselquist et al., 1999).
Although the present findings provide evidence in support of the
mediating role of psychological tension, this evidence is prelimi-
nary for at least two reasons. First, although we provide a logic for
explaining why failure to forgive is at odds with each component
of commitment, the present work was not designed to examine
empirically whether each of these three lines of reasoning is valid
or not. Second, the measure of psychological tension shares some
method variance with the frequently used measures of psycholog-
ical well-being, at least with the measure of negative affect. In this
respect, it was encouraging that the present work obtained evi-
dence in support of mediation not only for negative affect but also
for life satisfaction and state self-esteem (i.e., constructs that are
positive, unlike psychological tension). Accordingly, it is plausible
that psychological tension, created by thinking about the lack of
forgiveness for another to whom we feel strong commitment,
influences the more general experience of well-being.
Study 4 provided complementary evidence in support of the
general claim that the benefits of forgiveness are partner specific.
Indeed, Study 4 revealed a significantly more pronounced associ-
ation between the tendency to forgive one’s spouse and satisfac-
tion with life than between the tendency to forgive others in
general and satisfaction with life. This finding, observed for both
men and women who are involved in marital relationships, indi-
cates that one needs to take into account the interdependence
features underlying the relationship between the individual and the
target of forgiving (cf. Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). That is,
forgiving may only be associated with psychological well-being
for partners to whom one experiences strong levels of commitment
(i.e., long-term orientation, intent to persist, and psychological
attachment). Moreover, the findings of Study 4 may help under-
standing of why prior research often failed to reveal significantly
positive correlations between general dispositions to forgive and
psychological well-being (e.g., Tangney, Fee, Reinsmith, Boone,
& Lee, 1999). Indeed, the present findings suggest that the dis-
tinction between general forgiveness and partner-specific forgive-
ness is important to understanding the possible benefits of forgive-
ness (for similar theorizing, see Fincham, 2000; McCullough,
Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000).
Strengths, Limitations, and Implications
To our knowledge, the present research is the first study that has
addressed the role of relationship-specific features in understand-
ing the association between forgiving and psychological well-
being. Four independent studies (and two studies that are reported
in Footnotes 7 and 8), which used substantially different methods
and samples, provide converging evidence for the general hypoth-
esis, predicting a more pronounced, positive association between
forgiveness and psychological well-being when commitment is
strong rather than weak. As noted earlier, these findings make an
important contribution to the rapidly growing literature of forgive-
ness, which has addressed the psychological benefits of forgive-
ness but has not yet provided a satisfactory answer. Indeed, the
most important contribution of the present research derives from
the fact that consideration of commitment—a relationship-specific
variable—is essential to understanding whether and when forgive-
ness may serve psychological well-being.
At the same time, we acknowledge several limitations of the
present research. To begin with, the present research did not
systematically examine the temporal sequence of the principal
variables under study. In fact, all four experiments tended to use
methods whereby commitment is set, or fixed at the level of
assessment, which may render some alternative explanations plau-
sible. For example, one may argue that if the level of commitment
were not set, individuals might respond by reducing commitment,
thereby reducing psychological tension—indeed, the lack of for-
giveness does tend to reduce commitment (Finkel et al., 2002;
McCullough et al., 1998). It is also possible, even plausible, that
the lack of forgiveness influences third variables that are essential
to understanding later commitment. For example, when unable to
forgive, individuals may not only psychologically but also socially
distance themselves from what were good friends, so that the lack
of any interaction reduces level of commitment. Thus, we ac-
knowledge various lines of reasoning that suggest that a lack of
forgiveness may cause reduced levels of commitment.
We must admit that we are in fact quite optimistic about mod-
eration of the association between forgiveness and psychological
well-being by commitment, even when commitment was assessed
some time before the offense occurred. One reason is that com-
mitment tends to exhibit strong levels of consistency over time,
providing support for its conceptualization as a relatively stable
relationship feature or macromotive rooted in a history of many
interaction experiences (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Rusbult, 1983;
Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; cf. Wieselquist et al., 1999). Also,
such optimism is based on the fact that in the present research most
participants were able to generate an instance of an offense that
they had not forgiven another person to whom they were strongly
committed. In other words, there appear to be “friends for life,”
despite some inevitable hurt and lack of forgiveness (cf. Fincham,
2000; Finkel et al., 2002).8 Of course, the ultimate test of such
reasoning is to be found in longitudinal or prospective research,
examining whether earlier commitment assessed prior to the of-
fense moderates the association between later forgiveness and later
psychological well-being. Such research may also illuminate the
intricate feedback loops between commitment, forgiveness, and
psychological well-being, as well as the various third variables that
may help explain intrapersonal and interpersonal processes that are
8 A case in point can be derived from our earlier research described in
Footnote 6. This research revealed that nearly 3 out of 4 participants (73%)
were able to generate an instance of a conflict that they had not forgiven
another person to whom they were strongly committed—and they gener-
ally did so without a lot of thinking time. Thus, although not all people may
be faced with an unforgiving conflict with a strong commitment other,
most people do seem to experience such tension-arousing situations. Such
evidence, although somewhat indirect, is consistent with assumptions
stressing the idea that eventually transgressions, misbehavior, and viola-
tions of norms do take place in strongly committed relationships and that
such offenses give rise to the challenge of forgiving (e.g., Fincham, 2000;
Finkel et al., 2002).
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relevant to the stability and change in commitment, forgiveness,
and psychological well-being.
Second, apart from the temporal sequence and feedback loops
among the variables, the present research does not speak directly
to the possible long-term consequences of forgiving (or long-term
consequences of failure to forgive). In particular, Studies 1–3 do
not address long-term effects but instead focus on temporal fluc-
tuations in well-being, resulting from bringing to mind a conflict
that is either forgiven or not forgiven. Study 4 may be of some
relevance to long-term consequences, in that tendencies toward
forgiving one’s spouse were positively associated with satisfaction
with life for men and women involved in ongoing relationships. As
noted earlier, longitudinal and prospective designs could be used to
explore the temporally extended benefits of forgiveness (or costs
of failure to forgive), at least in the context of committed
relationships.
Third and finally, one limitation may be gleaned from the fact
that, as in much previous work, in Study 1 participants were
instructed to bring to mind an incident of an interpersonal offense
and whether they had or had not forgiven the offender. We do not
know whether—and if so, how frequently—people themselves
bring to mind incidents of interpersonal offense that they have
versus have not forgiven another person (cf. McCullough et al.,
1998). In a related manner, the present research focuses on intra-
psychic forgiving (i.e., the psychological and emotional changes
within a person) but does not directly address interpersonal for-
giving, the behavioral actions toward the offender (Exline &
Baumeister, 2000). Indeed, associations of psychological well-
being with self-activated thinking about interpersonal offenses
(e.g., rumination; McCullough et al., 1998) and interpersonal as-
pects of forgiveness represent important topics for future research.
We close by outlining two broad implications of the present
research, a theoretical and a practical implication. First, prior
theory and research have indicated that well-being is associated
with several intrapersonal variables, such as coping, emotion reg-
ulation, cognitive dampening, and appraisal (for reviews, see
Salovey, Rothman, & Rodin, 1998; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996).
Such knowledge has contributed to understanding of the effec-
tive—and not so effective—ways in which different people ap-
proach, regulate, and process positive and negative events. How-
ever, the extant literature of psychological well-being has devoted
relatively less attention, at least explicit attention, to whether or
how truly interpersonal variables (such as relational commitment)
may help understanding of the bases for psychological well-being
(for similar reasoning, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diener,
2000; Myers, 2000). We suggest that specific interpersonal expe-
riences and the ways in which people deal with such experiences,
intrapersonally and interpersonally, may well further contribute to
understanding of the roots and fruits of happiness.
Second, the present findings may also have implications for
counseling and therapy. Although the present research is not
concerned with traumatic experiences, it becomes somewhat ques-
tionable whether it is sensible to recommend interpersonal forgiv-
ing without taking into consideration the nature of the relationship
between the person and the offender. Indeed, for several offenses,
it may well be that forgiving does not contribute to psychological
well-being when the relationship with the offender is one of low
commitment. Under these circumstances it may also be useful to
consider alternatives for forgiving, such as seeking to distance
oneself from the other. In other words, forgiving need not always
be the best response to unresolved interpersonal conflicts.
References
Agnew, C. R., Van Lange, P. A. M., Rusbult, C. E., & Langston, C. A.
(1998). Cognitive interdependence: Commitment and the mental repre-
sentation of close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 74, 939–954.
Al-Mabuk, R. H., Enright, R. D., & Cardis, P. A. (1995). Forgiving
education with parentally love-deprived late adolescents. Journal of
Moral Education, 24, 427–444.
Aron, A., & Aron, E. N. (1997). Self-expansion motivation and including
other in the self. In S. Duck (Ed.), Handbook of personal relationships:
Theory, research and interventions (2nd ed., pp. 251–270). Chichester,
England: Wiley.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships
as including other in the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 60, 241–253.
Baldwin, M. W. (1995). Relational schemas and cognition in close rela-
tionships. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 12, 547–552.
Baldwin, M. W., Keelan, J. P. R., Fehr, B., Enns, V., & Koh-Rangarajoo,
E. (1996). Social–cognitive conceptualization of attachment working
models: Availability and accessibility effects. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 71, 94–109.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable
distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and
statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 51, 1173–1182.
Batson, D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert &
S. T. Fiske (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp.
282–316). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for
interpersonal attachment as a fundamental human motivation. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 117, 497–529.
Cialdini, R. B., & Kenrick, D. T. (1976). Altruism as hedonism: A social
development perspective on the relationship of negative mood state and
helping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 907–914.
Coyle, C. T., & Enright, R. D. (1997). Forgiving intervention with post-abortion
men. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 1042–1046.
Davenport, D. S. (1991). The functions of anger and forgiveness: Guide-
lines for psychotherapy with victims. Psychotherapy, 28, 140–144.
Dehue, F. M., McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. B. G. (1993). Social
value related response latencies: Unobtrusive evidence for individual
differences in information processing. European Journal of Social Psy-
chology, 23, 273–293.
Diener, E. (1994). Assessing subjective well-being: Progress and opportu-
nities. Social Indicators Research, 31, 103–157.
Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: The science of happiness and a
proposal for a national index. American Psychologist, 55, 34–43.
Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The Satisfaction
With Life Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49, 71–75.
Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., & Smith, H. L. (1999). Subjective well-being:
Three decades of progress. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 276–302.
Drigotas, S. M., & Rusbult, C. E. (1992). Should I stay or should I go? A
dependence model of breakups. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 62, 62–87.
Enright, R. D., & The Human Development Study Group. (1991). The
moral development of forgiving. In W. Kurines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), The
handbook of moral behavior and development (Vol. 1, pp. 123–151).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Expressing forgiving and repen-
tance: Benefits and barriers. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament, &
C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research and practice (pp.
133–155). New York: Guilford Press.
1025FORGIVING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Fincham, F. D. (2000). The kiss of the porcupines: From attributing
responsibility to forgiving. Personal Relationships, 7, 1–23.
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Hannon, P. A., Kumashiro, M., & Childs,
N. M. (2002). Dealing with betrayal in close relationships: Does com-
mitment promote forgiveness? Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 82, 956–974.
Fitzgibbons, R. P. (1986). The cognitive and emotive uses of forgiving in
the treatment of anger. Psychotherapy, 23, 629–633.
Freedman, S. R., & Enright, R. D. (1996). Forgiving as an intervention goal
with incest survivors. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychol-
ogy, 64, 983–992.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring
individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association
Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480.
Heatherton, T. F., & Polivy, J. (1991). Development and validation of a
scale for measuring state self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60, 895–910.
Hebl, J. H., & Enright, R. D. (1993). Forgiving as a psychotherapeutic goal
with elderly females. Psychotherapy, 30, 658–667.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Holmes, J. G., & Rempel, J. K. (1989). Trust in close relationships. In H.
Clyde (Ed.), Close relationships. Review of personality and social psy-
chology (Vol. 10, pp. 187–220). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hope, D. (1987). The healing paradox of forgiveness. Psychotherapy, 24,
240–244.
Kelley, H. H. (1983). The situational origins of human tendencies: A
further reason for the formal analysis of structures. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 9, 8–36.
Kelley, H. H. (1997). The “stimulus field” for interpersonal phenomena:
The source of language and thought about interpersonal events. Person-
ality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 140–169.
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A theory
of interdependence. New York: Wiley.
Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., & Suh, E. (1996). Discriminant validity of
well-being measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
616–628.
McCullough, M. E. (2000). Forgiveness as human strength: Theory, mea-
surement, and links to well-being. Journal of Social and Clinical Psy-
chology, 19, 43–55.
McCullough, M. E., Hoyt, W. T., & Rachal, K. C. (2000). What we know
(and need to know) about assessing forgiveness constructs. In M. E.
McCullough, K. I. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness:
Theory, research and practice (pp. 65–88). New York: Guilford Press.
McCullough, M. E., Pargament, K. I., & Thoresen, C. E. (2000). The psy-
chology of forgiveness: History, conceptual issues, and overview. In M. E.
McCullough, K. I. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness:
Theory, research and practice (pp. 1–14). New York: Guilford Press.
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. C., Sandage, S. J., Worthington, E. L., Jr.,
Wade Brown, S., & Hight, T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiving in close
relationships: II. Theoretical elaboration and measurement. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1586–1603.
McCullough, M. E., Sandage, S. J., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (1997). To
forgive is human. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity.
McCullough, M. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Rachal, K. C. (1997).
Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 73, 321–336.
Myers, D. G. (2000). The funds, friends, and faith of happy people.
American Psychologist, 55, 56–67.
Reis, H. T., Collins, W. A., & Berscheid, E. (2000). The relationship
context of human behavior and development. Psychological Bulletin,
126, 844–872.
Rusbult, C. E. (1983). A longitudinal test of the investment model: The
development (and deterioration) of satisfaction and commitment in
heterosexual involvements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 45, 101–117.
Rusbult, C. E., Martz, J. M., & Agnew, C. R. (1998). The Investment
Model Scale: Measuring commitment level, satisfaction level, quality of
alternatives, and investment size. Personal Relationships, 5, 357–391.
Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1996). Interdependence processes.
In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Hand-
book of basic principles (pp. 564–596). New York: Guilford Press.
Rusbult, C. E., Van Lange, P. A. M., Wildschut, T., Yovetich, N. A., &
Verette, J. (2000). Perceived superiority in close relationships: Why it exists
and persists. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 521–545.
Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., & Lipkus, I.
(1991). Accommodation processes in close relationships: Theory and
preliminary empirical evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 60, 53–78.
Salovey, P., Rothman, A. J., & Rodin, J. (1998). Health behavior. In D. T.
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social
psychology (pp. 633–683). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Steiger, J. H. (1980). Tests for comparing elements of a correlation matrix.
Psychological Bulletin, 87, 245–251.
Stroebe, W., & Stroebe, M. (1996). The social psychology of social
support. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology:
Handbook of basic principles (pp. 597–621). New York: Guilford Press.
Tangney, J., Fee, R., Reinsmith, C., Boone, A. L., & Lee, N. (1999,
August). Assessing individual differences in the propensity to forgive.
Paper presented at the 107th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1991). Being better but not smarter than others: The
Muhammad Ali effect at work in interpersonal situations. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 690–694.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Agnew, C. R., Harinck, F., & Steemers, G. E. M.
(1997). From game theory to real life: How social value orientation
affects willingness to sacrifice in ongoing close relationships. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1330–1344.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A.
(1997). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive ori-
entations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 73, 733–746.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Rusbult, C. E., Drigotas, S. M., Arriaga, X. B., Witcher,
B. S., & Cox, C. L. (1997). Willingness to sacrifice in close relationships.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1373–1395.
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Visser, K. (1999). Locomotion in social dilemmas:
How people adapt to cooperative, tit-for-tat, and noncooperative part-
ners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 762–773.
VanOyen Witvliet, C., Ludwig, T. E., & Vander Laan, K. L. (2001).
Granting forgiveness or harboring grudges: Implications for emotion,
physiology, and health. Psychological Science, 121, 117–123.
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1991). Self- versus peer ratings of specific
emotional traits: Evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 927–940.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and vali-
dation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS
scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063–1070.
Wieselquist, J., Rusbult, C. E., Foster, G. A., & Agnew, C. R. (1999).
Commitment, pro-relationship behavior, and trust in close relationships.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 942–966.
Yovetich, N. A., & Rusbult, C. E. (1994). Accommodative behavior in
close relationships: Exploring transformation of motivation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 138–164.
Received December 31, 2001
Revision received July 3, 2002
Accepted July 8, 2002 
1026 KARREMANS, VAN LANGE, OUWERKERK, AND KLUWER
